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Abstract 
Digital contact tracing and analysis of social distancing from smartphone location data are two prime 
examples of non-therapeutic interventions used in many countries to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic. While many understand the importance of trading personal privacy for the public good, others 
have been alarmed at the potential for surveillance via measures enabled through location tracking on 
smartphones. In our research, we analyzed massive yet atomic individual-level location data containing 
over 22 billion records from ten “Blue” (Democratic) and ten “Red” (Republican) cities in the U.S., based 
on which we present, herein, some of the first evidence of how Americans responded to the increasing 
concerns that government authorities, the private sector, and public health experts might use individual-
level location data to track the COVID-19 spread. First, we found a significant decreasing trend of mobile-
app location-sharing opt out. Whereas areas with more Democrats were more privacy-concerned than areas 
with more Republicans before the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a significant decrease in 
the overall opt-out rates after COVID-19, and this effect was more salient among Democratic than 
Republican cities. Second, people who practiced social distancing (i.e., those who traveled less and 
interacted with fewer close contacts during the pandemic) were also less likely to opt out, whereas the 
converse was true for people who practiced less social-distancing. This relationship also was more salient 
among Democratic than Republican cities. Third, high-income populations and males, compared with low-
income populations and females, were more privacy-conscientious and more likely to opt out of location 
tracking. Overall, our findings demonstrate that during COVID-19, people in both Blue and Red cities 
generally reacted in a consistent manner in trading their personal privacy for the greater social good but 
diverged in the extent of that trade-off along the lines of political affiliation, social-distancing compliance, 
and demographics.  
 
1 We thank Panos Adamopolous, Ravi Bapna, Indranil Bardhan, Gordon Burtch, Prithwiraj Choudhury, Alok Gupta, De Liu, Eitan 
Muller, Unnati Narang, Arun Rai, Danny Sokol, Vilma Todri, Catherine Tucker, Raluca Ursu, Yuqian Xu, Michael F Zhao, Peter 
Zubscek and webinar participants in the Carlson Online MIS Seminar for very helpful comments that have improved the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
In the very early days of COVID-19, as health experts realized that human-to-human transmission was 
happening, they advised the public to practice “social distancing,” a tactic commonly employed in the past 
to combat health epidemics. Stay-at-home orders were also put in place in many communities globally as 
another non-pharmaceutical intervention or measure taken to mitigate the COVID-19 spread. The related 
issue of location tracking of citizens’ whereabouts, widely covered by major news outlets, has seized public 
attention and reignited debate over the efficacy and legality of government surveillance and privacy rights.  
In early March of 2020, as COVID-19 continued to spread rapidly all over the world, scientists and 
health officials were puzzled by the exceedingly high infection and fatality rates in certain parts of the world 
such as Italy and Spain. Vodafone subsequently provided Italian officials with anonymized customer data 
to track and analyze population movements in Italy, where a government-mandated lockdown was in place. 
A crucial insight gleaned from the analysis of the data was that up to 40% of residents in Milan still moved 
every day 300-500 meters beyond their homes despite the lockdown, which finding revealed the extent of 
social-distancing non-compliance as a significant driving factor of COVID-19’s diffusion in Italy. In the 
meantime, active contact tracing as well as monitoring of possibly infected people and those who had come 
into contact with any suspected cases was widely publicized as being effective in curbing the COVID-19 
spread,2 particularly in countries such as Taiwan, China, Singapore, Israel, and South Korea.  
Highly granular location data revealing all of the locations of a given consumer in the immediate 
past is needed for successful implementation of contact tracing. By virtue of the fact that consumers are 
wedded to their smartphones and have widely adopted wearable technologies, such data is available to 
telecom providers, digital platforms, wearable technology and smartwatch firms, and mobile app 
developers.3 The consequent news headlines in mainstream media such as CNN4 and Fox News5 led to 
many people becoming aware of contact tracing, location-data tracking, and potential surveillance concerns. 
One of the inadvertent consequences of this heightened awareness was increased public concern about 
surveillance and privacy.6 It is well known that apps make it feasible for different elements of the mobile 
ecosystem to track consumers’ locations. One perspective held by some consumers is that since lives are at 
stake, it is imperative that we look at data privacy through a different lens, at least until the pandemic is 
mitigated and suppressed. In the UK, more than two-thirds of the population backed the use of CCTV 
footage, mobile phone data, and credit card records in a mass ‘contact tracing’ exercise to prevent a second 
 
2 https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/unlocking-platform-technology-to-combat-health-pandemics-by-anindya-ghose-and-d-daniel-sokol/. 
3 https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/tap. 
4 https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/10/health/coronavirus-contact-tracing/index.html; https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/18/tech/us-government-
location-data-coronavirus/index.html. 
5 https://www.foxnews.com/tech/us-government-big-tech-smartphone-coronavirus-google-facebook. https://www.foxnews.com/tech/taiwans-so-
called-electronic-fence-monitor-for-those-quarantined-raises-privacy-concerns-report 
6 https://www.ft.com/content/005ab1a8-1691-4e7b-8e10-0d3d2614a276. 
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wave of coronavirus infections.7 On the other hand, skeptical consumers have complained that access to 
such atomic consumer data is an infringement of their civil liberties. They are especially concerned that 
contact tracing may enable intrusions into their everyday lives by governments or big tech companies.8 
A 2017 Reuters poll9 found that a majority of Americans were unwilling to give up privacy to assist 
the U.S. government’s national security initiatives: over 76% reported being unwilling to yield information 
on their internet activities even if it would help the U.S. government’s security initiatives. But would 
Americans behave differently during a pandemic? According to April 2020 research from CodeFuel10, 84% 
of U.S. adults said that they would be willing to share their health data to deter the spread of the virus, and 
more than half (58%) of respondents said that they would be open to disclosing their location—both 
important factors that can help public officials flag hot spots. Another recent survey11 based on responses 
from 1,374 American adults found that two-thirds were willing to install an app that would help slow the 
spread of the virus and reduce the lockdown period, even if that app collected information about their 
location data and health status. Moreover, people whom the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has 
identified as being at higher risk, those who are younger and those who are more technologically savvy, 
were more likely to be willing to install such an app.  
Meanwhile, studies have also shown that whereas low-income populations in the U.S. are aware of 
a range of digital privacy harms, it is difficult for them to access the tools and strategies that could help 
them protect their personal information online.12 Conversely, high-income populations are more likely to 
be both aware of potential harms and technologically savvier in their ability to protect their data privacy. 
Besides, studies have shown that political party affiliation and political ideology impact how Americans 
feel about institutional surveillance more than do income, age, gender, and race.13 More specifically, a 2018 
study showed that Republicans tend to feel pleased about tracking, both online and in real life, while 
Democrats often feel bad about it.14 Conservative Republicans were found to have warmer responses to 
surveillance scenarios, whereas liberal Democrats had cooler responses, with moderates and Independents 
somewhere in the middle. These facts motivated us to incorporate differences between Democrats and 
Republicans in their privacy choices as exhibited by differences in opt-out rates on mobile apps that allow 
for location tracking.  
 
7 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/04/04/public-backs-tracking-people-phones-monitor-coronavirus-infection/. 
8 https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-04-26/privacy-americans-trade-off-trace-coronavirus-contacts. 
9 Dustin Volz, “Most Americans unwilling to give up privacy to thwart attacks: Reuters/Ipsos Poll,” Reuters, April 4, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-poll/most-americansunwilling-to-give-up-privacy-to-thwart-attacks-reuters-ipsos-poll-
idUSKBN1762TQ . 
10 https://www.emarketer.com/content/consumers-are-more-willing-to-share-private-data-during-covid-19 
11 https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/will-americans-be-willing-to-install-covid-19-tracking-apps/ 
12 https://datasociety.net/pubs/prv/DataAndSociety_PrivacySecurityandDigitalInequalityPressRelease.pdf. 
13We Feel: Partisan Politics Drive Americans’ Emotions Regarding Surveillance of Low-Income Populations,” 
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Turow-Divided-Final.pdf. 
14 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/technology/privacy-concerns-politics.html. 
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In this research, we aimed to examine and quantify the impact of socio-economic factors including 
demographics (such as age, income, race, gender, and income) and political affiliation (such as whether 
they live in a top 10 red city or top 10 blue city) on the following two metrics: (i) social distancing and (ii) 
privacy behavior. We focused on demographics, because a number of articles from both academia and the 
mainstream media have discussed heterogeneity in behavior as driven by the above-noted demographic 
factors. Prior research has shown that the compliance rates of non-therapeutic interventions among young 
adults are less than the average compliance rates, because young adults in the U.S. do not follow protective 
behaviors to the same extent as other segments of the population do.15 Lower compliance among them 
makes it easier to spread infections, as they have higher levels of human contact. Specifically, we focused 
on three main research questions: (1) how overall privacy choice (i.e., opt out) respecting mobile location-
data sharing has changed before and after COVID-19 being declared a national emergency, (2) how such 
changes in privacy choice vary across demographic groups in blue (Democratic) cities and red (Republican) 
cities, and (3) what the relationship between individuals’ practice of social distancing and willingness to 
share mobile location data during COVID-19 is, and how it varies with political affiliation. Our analyses 
revealed three major findings. First, there is a significant decreasing trend of mobile-app location-sharing 
opt out in the U.S. Whereas areas with more Democrats were more privacy-concerned than areas with more 
Republicans before the advent of the COVID-19 crisis, there was a significant decrease in overall opt-out 
rates after COVID-19, which effect was more salient among Democratic than Republican cities. Second, 
people who practice social distancing (i.e., those who travel less and interact with fewer close contacts 
during the pandemic) are less likely to opt out, while the converse is true for those less compliant with 
social distancing. This effect appeared to be more salient among Democratic than Republican cities after 
COVID-19. Third, high-income people and males are more privacy-concerned, and thus more likely to opt 
out of location tracking. This research endeavored to make a valuable contribution to the literature of 
privacy and pro-social consumer behaviors by demonstrating a powerful pro-sociality-motivated 
relinquishing of personal privacy, particularly as massive granular individual-level location data have 
become an increasingly prominent tool for academic research, policy making, and combating the present, 
unprecedented pandemic.  
2. Literature 
Our research is closely related to the literature on consumer privacy and pro-social behaviors as well as 
social distancing, political affiliation and demographics amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Below we will 
concisely review each literature. 
 
15 Singh et al. BMC Infectious Diseases (2019) 19:221. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12879-019-3703-2. 
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2.1 Consumer Privacy and Pro-social Behavior 
Granular location data and other consumer data have generated widespread concern for consumer privacy 
(Wedel and Kannan 2016). In the business context, privacy broadly pertains to the protection of individually 
identifiable information online and offline along with the adoption and implementation of privacy policies 
and regulations. In the context of location data, privacy concerns may arise from, for instance, identification 
of sensitive information such as home address, workplace location, daily movements, or social-distancing 
compliance. There is a rich literature on Information Systems and Marketing as it pertains to consumer 
privacy, the data sources being surveys (Acquisti et al. 2012), direct marketing (Goh et al. 2015), and digital 
advertising (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011; Ghose 2017). Researchers also have investigated how consumers 
make privacy choices of platform-provided privacy settings (e.g., Burtch et al. 2015; Adjerid et al. 2019) 
and how they select opt-in/out options provided by email marketing programs (Kumar et al.2014). Overall, 
this research points to the positive effects of granting consumers enhanced control over their own privacy.  
Besides egocentric motivations such as financial benefits (Soleymanian et al. 2017), consumers 
may choose to relinquish privacy for altruistic reasons, such as to support national security post-9/11 in the 
form of the Patriot Act and its broad expansion of the federal government’s surveillance powers.16 Similarly, 
amid an unprecedented pandemic like COVID-19, some people may reduce their opt out of location 
tracking for the social good, such as for digital contact tracing and city-wide social-distancing analyses to 
identify clusters of outbreak and hotspots. Although the specific research on the potential tradeoff between 
privacy concerns and pro-social behaviors is limited, studies such as that by Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal 
(2015) in the context of online fund-raising campaigns for charities have shown that reduced privacy 
settings (e.g., access to information controls for concealment of personal identity or contribution amount) 
increases pro-social behaviors. Whereas monitoring such as through location tracking and contact tracing 
can cause uneasiness, the feeling of being observed and accountable can incentivize people to engage in 
pro-social behaviors or adhere to social norms (Acquisti et al. 2015).  
The literature on pro-social consumer behavior has also demonstrated various motivations for 
consumers’ pro-social behaviors, including both egocentric motivations (e.g., ego utility, self-signaling, 
and reputation benefits) and altruistic motives (Gershon et al. 2020). Related to the present COVID-19 
pandemic, sympathy biases, such as for identifiable victims, are also shown to drive the extent of pro-social 
behaviors (Sudhir et al. 2016). As demonstrated by this literature, pro-social tendency can be escalated by 
contextual factors. Even general coverage of climate change or global warming by major media outlets, for 
instance, can exert an overall positive impact on the sales of hybrid vehicles (Chen et al. 2019). In times of 
 
16 After 9/11, we gave up privacy for security. Will we make the same trade-off after COVID-19? 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/08/coronavirus-will-we-give-up-privacy-for-security/. 
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sudden and widespread crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, filled as they are with life-and-death 
decisions, negative emotions, as well as divergent risk perceptions and behavioral norms, it is plausible that 
consumers would exhibit heightened pro-social behaviors as exemplified by better compliance with shelter-
at-home policies to protect others’ health and reduced opt outs in location tracking from mobile devices to 
support various initiatives, such as social-distancing monitoring, contact tracing, and other public safety 
measures. Bagozzi and Moore (1994) show that public service ads designed to reduce the incidence of child 
abuse stimulate negative emotions that result in empathic reactions and increased willingness to help.  
Finally, there is also evidence that most people do not make the effort to truly understand the 
privacy policies of mobile apps or websites, primarily because they are starved for time. A 2008 study 
estimated that it would take 244 hours a year for the typical internet user to read the privacy policies of all 
websites he or she visits— and that was before everyone carried smartphones with dozens of apps.17 
Another analysis, this one on the length and readability of privacy policies based on nearly 150 popular 
websites and apps, shows that it can take up to 18 minutes to read the privacy policies on certain platforms.18 
Schaub et al. (2017) argue that today’s privacy notices and controls are surprisingly ineffective at informing 
users or allowing them to express choice. MacDonald and Cranor (2008) demonstrate that it takes about 8 
to 12 minutes to read privacy policies on the most popular sites, their point estimate being 10 minutes per 
policy. With the increased time available due to shelter-at-home and social-distancing policies, at least for 
certain demographics and societal segments, it is conceivable that some consumers may finally have the 
time to read through the mobile apps’ privacy policies and react (either change their choices or maintain 
the status quo) accordingly given heightened surveillance concerns and awareness. 
2.2 Social Distancing, Political Affiliation, and Demographics 
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing has resulted in empirically verified, dramatic changes in 
where people spend their time and with how many people they interact. For instance, based on an analysis 
of anonymized location data in New York City, Bakker et al. (2020) show that distance travelled everyday 
dropped by 70%; the number of social contacts in certain places decreased by 93%, and the number of 
people staying home the whole day increased from 20 to 60%. Measuring the relative transmission-risk 
benefit and social cost of closing about thirty different location categories in the U.S. across eight 
dimensions of risk and importance and through composite indexes, Benzell et al. (2020) find that from 
February to March, there were larger declines in visits to locations that their measures imply should be 
closed first. Overall, while social distancing may reduce the population livelihood and entail personal 
inconvenience, it is shown to lead to substantial economic benefits. Greenstone and Nigam (2020) estimate 
 
17 https://www.salon.com/2017/10/14/nobody-reads-privacy-policies-heres-how-to-fix-that_partner/ 
18 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/12/opinion/facebook-google-privacy-policies.html 
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that moderate distancing beginning in late March 2020 would save 1.7 million lives by October 1, and that 
the mortality benefits of social distancing would be about $8 trillion or $60,000 per household. Social 
distancing is thus widely perceived, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, as a pro-social behavior.  
A number of recent studies have demonstrated a strong link between social-distancing compliance 
and political affiliation. For example, a higher percentage of Republican county vote share was found, based 
on location data, to be associated with increased social-distancing non-compliance, even after the 
declaration of a national emergency, and that, according to survey data, Democrats believe the pandemic 
to be more severe and report a greater reduction in contact with others (Fan et al. 2020). Also, based on 
location data, areas with more Republicans engage in less social distancing, and according to survey data, 
significant gaps exist between Republicans and Democrats in beliefs about personal risk and the future path 
of the pandemic (Allcott et al. 2020). Similarly, using internet search and location data, Barrios and 
Hochberg (2020) reveal that a higher percentage of Trump voters in a county is associated with a lower 
perceived risk associated with COVID-19 and less social distancing.  
Other studies have revealed a strong link between social-distancing compliance and demographics 
such as gender, income, and race. For instance, low-income, black, and Hispanic neighborhoods in New 
York City exhibit more work activity during the day and less sheltering in place during non-work hours 
(Coven and Gupta 2020). Similarly, Ruiz-Euler et al. (2020) present widespread evidence of a mobility gap, 
i.e., the decline in human mobility during COVID-19 lockdown happened at different speeds for high versus 
low income groups within most cities, as lockdown imposes low-income groups with a stringent choice 
between health and income. Wright et al. (2020) further suggest that poverty reduces social-distancing 
compliance. Conversely, Chiou and Tucker (2020) demonstrate that people from regions with either high-
income or high-speed Internet display more compliance with state-level directives to remain at home, which 
finding suggests an impact of the digital divide on the ability to comply with social-distancing policies. 
Painter and Qiu (2020) show that Democrats are less likely to respond to a state-level order when it is issued 
by a Republican governor relative to one issued by a Democratic governor. 
Our study distinguishes itself from the extant literature in the following ways: (1) it is based on 
unique, massive, individual-level location data, whereas nearly all of the prior work leveraged aggregate 
location data; (2) it examines opt-out decrease as a valuable pro-social indicator of the criticality of location 
tracking in the unprecedented combat against the COVID-19 pandemic.  
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3. Data 
For the purposes of our analysis, we combined two datasets: individual-level GPS location tracking data, 
and census-block-level demographic data from The American Community Survey (2016). 19  For the 
location data, we collaborated with a leading data collector that aggregates location data across hundreds 
of commonly used mobile applications ranging from news to weather, map navigation, and fitness. The 
location-data collection was performed through a GDPR- and CCPA-compliant framework. The data covers 
one-quarter of the U.S. population across the Android and iOS operating systems.20 Each row of the data 
corresponds to a location recorded for an individual. Each row contains information about 1) User ID - an 
anonymized unique identifier of an individual using a mobile app, 2) Latitude, longitude and timestamp of 
a location visited, 3) Speed at which the location was captured, and 4) App category - the type of mobile 
app, such as news or weather, that captured the location.  
In total, we collected, from January 1 to April 15th, 2020, detailed, fine-grained location data on 
individuals in 20 major U.S. cities including Baltimore (MD), Washington D.C., Boston (MA), San 
Francisco (CA), New Orleans (LA), New York City (NY), Seattle (WA), Pittsburgh (PA), Philadelphia 
(PA), Austin (TX), Phoenix (AZ), Arlington (TX), Oklahoma City (OK), Wichita (KS), Nashville (TN), 
Omaha (NE), Lexington (KY), Colorado Springs (CO), Virginia Beach (VA), and Jacksonville (FL).21 We 
choose these cities based on the respective political affiliations shown in recent national elections. Among 
the 20 cities, the former ten are rated as among the Top-10 most liberal cities, and the latter ten, the Top-
10 most conservative cities.22 For each of the 20 cities, we parsed through an average of 150k individuals, 
70 locations per individual per day, 1.5M unique locations overall, and 1.1B rows of individual location 
data.23 To create the final panel dataset for our empirical analysis, we selected a random sample of 25,000 
individuals24 per city. For each individual, we identified the home address25 and assigned the demographics 
of the census block that was closest26 to the home address. 
 
19 We obtained Census Block Group data from SafeGraph: https://docs.safegraph.com/docs/open-census-data#section-census-
demographic-data.  
20 Although due to data anonymity we did not observe the demographics of each individual user in our data, we did observe the 
geographical distribution of users’ home locations covering all census blocks in each city. In addition, we also observed users who 
opted out of location tracking for nearly all census blocks in a given city (instead of a selected subset of blocks). Put simply, there 
was no systematic selection for opt-outs. Therefore, our user sample can be considered to be well representative of the U.S. 
populations in the cities studied. 
21 Each city is defined as including the Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
22 Tausanovitch, C. and Warshaw, C. 2014. “Representation in Municipal Government,” American Political Science Review (108:3), 
pp.605-641. https://ctausanovitch.com/Municipal_Representation_140502.pdf. 
23 Depending on the app setting, the locations are typically tracked every 5-20 minutes throughout the day, or when a person moves 
out beyond 100 meters even within 5 minutes.  
24 We tried different sizes of random samples and found 25k to be a rather representative sample with a highly consistent data 
distribution as the full sample.  
25 We assigned the most frequent location captured during 3 - 5 AM to an individual as their home address. A similar heuristic was 
used to identify home address from location data in a previous study (Macha et. al 2019).   
26 For assignment of the census block, the Haversine distance between the individual's home address and the interpolated center 
latitude and longitude of the Census Block Group provided by SafeGraph was computed.  
9 
Table 1a. Variable Description 
Variable Set Level Variable Name Variable Description 
 
Privacy Outcome 
Individual OptOut Indicator of individual who stopped sharing location 
data - opted out of location tracking 
Block OptOutCount Number of people who stopped sharing location data 
on certain day (opted out) 
Privacy Controls Block TotalActiveUsers Total daily number of people sharing location data 
(opted in) 
 Block TotalNewUsers Number of people who newly started sharing 
location data in block. 
Social Distancing Individual 
/Block 
TotalContacts Sum of daily unique contacts for all individuals 
 Individual 
/Block 
TotalDistance Average of daily total distance traveled (km) 
 Individual 
/Block 
AvgSpeed Average of daily mean speed (kmph) 
COVID-19 
Health Risk 
City/County 
 
Infection Rate 
 
Ratio of daily infected COVID-19 cases by 
population 
 City/County Death Rate Ratio of daily deaths by infected cases 
 
Social 
Demographics 
Block Gender Proportions of male and female populations in each 
block 
Block Income Proportions of households with 
income <60K, 60-100K, 100-150K, 150-200K, 
>200K 
Block Race Proportions of White, Black, Asian, and Native 
Indian populations in each block 
Block Population Density Population 
Amount of land (in acres) in each block 
App Usage Individual 
/Block 
TotalAppUsage Total duration of mobile app use on specific day 
(minutes) 
 Individual 
/Block 
AppUsageCategory Number of unique mobile app categories that people 
use on specific day 
 Individual 
/Block 
AppUsageHHI Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) defined using 
mobile app use duration by categories 
Political 
Affiliation 
City  
 
 Designated based on previous national elections 
5 “Blue” Cities Baltimore, DC, Boston, SFO, New Orleans 
5 “Red” Cities Omaha, Lexington, Colorado Springs, Virginia 
Beach, Jacksonville 
Treatment Country Treat Whether it is after declaration of National 
Emergency (on or after Mar. 13, 2020) 
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Table 1b. Variable Summary Statistics  
Variable Set Variable Name Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Privacy Outcome 
OptOut 0.02 0.005 0 1 
OptOutCount 0.32  1.41 0 219 
Privacy Controls TotalActiveUsers 19133 5074 5714 24942 
 TotalNewUsers 0.35  1.56 0  1900 
Social Distancing TotalContacts 5.59 23.78 0 787 
 TotalDistance 6.56 7.74 0 423 
 AvgSpeed 3.87 4.60 0 129 
COVID-19  
Health Risk 
Infection Rate (%) 
Death Rate (%) 
0.04 
0.01 
0.12 
0.03 
0 
0 
1.02 
0.36 
 
Social Demographics 
Gender (Male) 0.48 0.08 0.10 0.94 
Gender (Female) 0.51 0.08 0.06 0.90 
Income (<60K) 0.54  0.24 0 1 
Income (60-100K) 0.20 0.11 0 1 
Income (100-150K) 0.14 0.10 0 1 
Income (150-200K) 0.07 0.07 0 1 
Income (>200K) 0.09 0.12 0 1 
Race (White) 0.55 0.31 0 1 
Race (Black) 0.27 0.32 0 1 
Race (Asian) 0.09 0.14 0 1 
Race (Native Indian) 0.00 0.01 0 0.28 
Population 1339  840 3 15096 
Amount of land (in 
acres) in each block 
372 1858 3.34 50569 
App Usage TotalAppUsage 5.13  4.46 0 53.86 
 AppUsageCategory 0.28  0.21 0 5 
 AppUsageHHI 0.28  0.2 0 1 
Total # Observations:    22 Billion 
Observation Period:       January 1st, 2020 - April 15th, 2020 
 
In Tables 1a and 1b, we detail and provide the summary statistics (across all cities) for the four 
types of measures computed from the location and census block data.   
1. Privacy Choices: At the day level, an individual was considered “opt in” for location tracking on all 
days between the first and the last day we observed the individual’s locations in our data. If we never 
saw an individual’s records in the data after a particular day, we considered that individual to be “opt 
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out” after that last day (OptOut).27 28 We computed OptOutCount at the block-day level as the total 
number of individuals who opted out on that day in a given block. These two measures were our primary 
dependent variables modeled in our empirical analysis.29 For controls, we computed the total number of 
current opt-in individuals on a given day in each city (TotalActiveUsers), as well as the total number of 
new opt-in individuals first observed on that day and block (TotalNewUsers). 
2. Social Distancing: We determined “contact” between two individuals if they were co-located in the same 
10-meter radius at a popular location30 within a 15-minute window. This was motivated by various 
COVID-19 media studies that show that human-to-human transmission can occur when individuals 
come in close contact within similar distance and time windows (e.g., Benzell et al. 2020).31 At the block 
level, we summed the daily unique contacts for all individuals in the block (TotalContacts). To estimate 
the distance traveled by an individual, we computed the Haversine distance between two consecutive 
stay locations (TotalDistance)32. 
3. COVID-19 Health Risk: We considered two major measures of COVID-19 health risk: InfectionRate, 
which measures the ratio of the daily number of infected cases to the total population, and DeathRate, 
which measures the ratio of the daily number of deaths to the total number of infected cases.  
4. App Usage: For each individual, we derived the mobile app usage behavior every day using the 
timestamp and category information. Our data vendor provided a list consisting of approximately 30 app 
categories33. For each individual each day, we calculated the total app usage duration (TotalAppUsage), 
the number of unique app categories used (AppUsageCategory), and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
 
27 There is a chance when an individual uninstalls an app (instead of opting out of location sharing) that it will also lead to the 
cessation of location data. However, to completely disappear from our data, the individual needs to simultaneously uninstall all of 
the (hundreds of) affiliated apps that use the location-tracking SDK provided by our location data collector. Given the market share 
of the company and the coverage of their client apps, this was very unlikely to occur. In addition, we also conducted robustness 
tests to check individuals’ app usage and location data points tracked before the last day of observation (i.e., before the user opted 
out). If our result were due to uninstallations of all of the affiliated apps over time, we would expect to see an overall decreasing 
trend in daily app usage time, unique app categories, and the daily number of locations tracked over time before the opt-out. We 
did not find any such significant decreasing trend. We provide the detailed analyses in Section 6.3.  
28 It is also possible that an individual opts out of location tracking and then decides to opt in again, and then opts out again, etc. 
Based on our conversation with the company, very few users demonstrate such behavior. For our analysis, we adopted a 
conservative definition and considered only the last opt-out of the same user. In addition, note that when a user decides to opt out 
of location tracking, s/he can opt out of a specific app (each app has an opt-out option), but can also choose to opt out of all apps 
in our partner company's affiliated app network. In our study, we defined opt out as the strictest case wherein the user opts out of 
all apps. Therefore, our measure is a lower bound of the actual opt-out rate.  
29 For robustness checking, we also considered “opt in” instead of “opt out” (the user opt in and block-day-level total opt-in counts) 
as alternative outcome variables, and the results were highly consistent.  
30 Top 1% of locations based on popularity - number of unique individual visits to the locations. We also performed a sensitivity 
analysis based on alternative definitions of “contact” by varying the notion of location popularity (1.5 and 2%), and noticed that 
the distribution of the number of unique contacts remained similar.  
31 https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html;  
https://www.thelocal.de/20200417/what-you-need-to-know-about-plans-for-germanys-states-to-ease-lockdown. 
32 To compute the distance, we considered only locations more than 10 meters apart and where individuals have spent at least 1 
minute each.  
33 We observed major app categories including weather, news, fitness, health, education, business, social networking, etc. 
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(HHI) determined using category-level duration (AppUsageHHI) that captures the concentrations of 
preferences. 
5. Social Demographics: In addition to the individual-/block-level measures from the location data, we 
also compiled block-level social demographics (population density, proportions of different races, 
income levels, and gender).  
6. Treatment Indicator: We defined treatment as the declaration of the National Emergency for COVID-
19 by President Trump on March 13, 2020. This definition was motivated by the fact that during the 
same time period (March 10-20), news headlines appeared in mainstream media such as CNN34 and Fox 
News35 leading many people to become aware of contact tracing, location-data tracking, and potential 
surveillance concerns. 
Figure 1 shows the detailed, anonymized location data from twenty randomly sampled individuals 
with 2318 (2465) unique (total) locations in SFO on a certain day in the January 1-April 15 period.  
 
Figure 1. Sample GPS location data from 20 randomly sampled individuals in SFO 
 
34https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/10/health/coronavirus-contact-tracing/index.html; https:/3/www.cnn.com/2020/03/18/tech/us-
government-location-data-coronavirus/index.html.  
35https://www.foxnews.com/tech/us-government-big-tech-smartphone-coronavirus-google-facebook; 
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/taiwans-so-called-electronic-fence-monitor-for-those-quarantined-raises-privacy-concerns-report. 
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4. Model-Free Evidence 
Before specifying the econometric model to quantitatively understand privacy choices, we present 
qualitative model-free evidence. In Figure 2, we first show the overall distribution of monthly total opt outs 
across all 20 cities, one month before and one month after the national emergency declaration regarding 
COVID-19 on March 13. As we can see, there appeared to be a consistent decreasing trend in the opt outs 
in each city after COVID-19. To further validate this finding, we next plot detailed day-level trends.  
 
(2a) One Month before Mar. 13 
 
(2b) One Month after Mar. 13 
Figure 2. Total monthly opt outs in each of 20 cities one month (a) before / (b) after COVID-19 
national emergency (darker-red/light-yellow color representing more/fewer opt outs)/ 
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More specifically, we show the model-free evidence for our three major findings in Figures 3-7. In 
each of the figures, we plot day-level trends of average opt-out rates across the January 1 - April 7th, 2020 
period for a different grouping of blocks. The dotted line in each figure indicates March 13, the day 
President Trump declared the national emergency.  
4.1 Political Affiliation and Privacy Concern 
In Figure 3, we plot the day-level opt-out rates by pooling the 10 red and blue cities (and their corresponding 
blocks), respectively, together. From the figure, we observe that in general, before the COVID-19 
emergency declaration, blue cities were more privacy-concerned than red ones. This is consistent with 
recent studies showing that Republicans are less concerned about privacy than Democrats.36 Interestingly, 
we see that both red and blue cities show a decreasing trend in opt out after the declaration. Prominently, 
the decrease in opt-out rates is more salient in blue cities than in red ones. In addition, we also notice an 
interesting weekend/weekday effect—people are more likely to opt out during weekends than weekdays. 
This pattern becomes less prominent after COVID-19, potentially due to the blurred boundary between 
weekends and weekdays after the stay-at-home order.  
 
Figure 3. Day trends of opt-out rates for red and blue cities 
 
4.2 Social Distancing and Privacy Concern 
In Figure 4, we plot the day-level opt-out rates for the 20 cities, where the blocks in each city are grouped 
by the number-of-contact quantiles. From the plots, we observe that in general, blocks with lesser social-
distancing practices (higher number-of-contact quantiles) have lower willingness to share location data 
(higher opt-out rates) compared with blocks with better social-distancing practice. We also observe that in 
 
36  “Divided We Feel: Partisan Politics Drive Americans’ Emotions Regarding Surveillance of Low-Income Populations,” 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/technology/privacy-concerns-politics.html. 
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Virginia Beach and San Francisco, the trend of the opt-out rate stays relatively the same for people 
practicing lesser social distancing even after the declaration.  
 
Figure 4. Day trends of city-level opt-out rates for different number-of-contact quantiles (Left, Blue 
cities; Right, Red cities) 
 
4.3 Social Demographics and Privacy Concern 
In Figure 5, we plot the opt-out rates for different cities, where the blocks are grouped based on the 
proportion of households with income more than $200K. Hence, blocks with a lower/higher proportion of 
households with income more than $200K belong to low-/high-income quantiles. In Figure 5, we see that 
in many cities (e.g., Boston, New Orleans, Philadelphia, NYC, Pittsburgh, Lexington, Wichita) high-
income people are more privacy-concerned compared with low-income people. After the emergency 
declaration, the drop in opt-out rates seemingly is heterogeneous across the different income groups.  
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Figure 5. Day trends of city-level opt-out rates for different income quantiles 
           (Left, blue cities; Right, red cities; three quantiles – from highest to lowest income) 
In Figure 6, we compare the opt-out rates across gender by grouping blocks with a higher/lower 
proportion of males. We observe that blocks with a higher male population are in general more privacy-
conscious than their counterparts. We can see that after the declaration, there is an overall drop in opt-out 
rates across all cities and across both genders.  
Finally, in Figure 7, we plot the opt-out rates across different racial diversities by grouping blocks 
with a higher/lower proportion of the white population. In Baltimore, DC, and New Orleans (all blue cities), 
we observe that blocks with a higher white population have a higher opt-out rate relative to more diverse 
census blocks. In Boston (blue), Jacksonville, and Omaha (red), we notice that people in relatively lower-
white-populated blocks (2nd quantile in Figure 7) tend to opt out more than do others. In all of Figures 4-
7, we notice that San Francisco shows little heterogeneity across all social demographics.  
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Figure 6. Day trends of city-level opt-out rates for males and females (Left, blue cities; Right, red 
cities) 
5. Empirical Methodology 
While the qualitative trend insights regarding opt-out rates from Figures 2-7 are useful, they do not control 
for many other shifts that were taking place during the time period. Therefore, to further examine the effects 
of social demographics, social distancing, and political affiliation on American’s privacy choices during 
COVID-19, we conducted detailed econometric analyses using panel data models at both the individual-
day level and the census-block-day level in each of the 20 cities.  
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Figure 7. Day trends of city-level opt-out rates for different racial diversities (Left, blue cities; 
Right, red cities) 
5.1 Social-Demographic Analyses 
More specifically, first we analyzed the effect of social demographics on an individual’s likelihood of 
opting out of mobile location tracking before and after President Trump declared the national emergency 
on March 13, 2020.37 We modeled the likelihood of the individual’s opt-out choice using the logit model  
Pr(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡) =  
exp(𝑈𝑖𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
1+exp(𝑈𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
 ,                                                       [1] 
where 
                               𝑈𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑡                             
[2] 
 
37 We also examined, as an alternative, the treatment effect of the state’s specific lockdown effects and found the results to be 
qualitatively similar. We will discuss this in more detail in Section 6, Table 5.  
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i represents each individual and t represents each day; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 is the binary treatment variable that indicates 
whether or not it was after the declaration of the national emergency, and 𝐷𝑖 are vectors containing the 
corresponding income/gender/race groups. For our analyses, we considered five different income groups 
(<60K, 60K-100K, 100K-150K, 150K-200K, >200K), two gender groups (Male, Female), and five racial 
groups (White, Black, Asian, Native Indian, Others). The interaction effect 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 is our variable of 
interest that captures the heterogeneous treatment effect of the COVID-19 national emergency declaration 
across different social-demographic groups.38  
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 and 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 are dummies to control for the week and day-of-week fixed effects. 𝑇𝑡 
is a day index (from 1 to 106) to control for any continuous time trend from January 1 to April 15, 2020. 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 controls for all of the user-day-level app usage factors, such as the user’s total app 
usage time, the total number of app activities, the total number of unique app categories, and the entropy of 
usage time across the different app categories on a certain day. Moreover, we considered 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡  and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡  to further control for the daily-level trend of user opt in to 
mobile location tracking. We ran the individual logit model for each of the 20 cities. In addition, 
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 captured any other additional factors such as the population density of the block where the 
individual resides, as well as the COVID-19-related health risk (infection rate and death rate).  
For robustness checking, we also ran these analyses using individual-level and day-level fixed effects. 
Notably, nonlinear models (e.g., Logit) sometimes are difficult to interpret, because the cross-partial may 
have a different sign than the coefficient on the interaction term (Ai and Norton 2003). So, to check the 
robustness of the coefficients in the interaction terms in the Logit model, we also conducted a similar 
analysis using the Linear Probability Model (LPM). 39  Overall, we found that the interaction effects 
remained qualitatively consistent. Our main results are shown in Table 2. We will discuss them in the next 
section.  
5.2 Social-Distancing and Political-Affiliation Analyses 
Beyond the social-demographic effect, we were also interested in the relationships among social distancing, 
political affiliation, and Americans’ privacy choices before and after COVID-19. To study such 
 
38 To be precise, the mean treatment effect estimated from our model is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT, E[y_i1 
– y_i0 | treat_i = 1]), because in our case, we didn’t have a formal control group but instead, multiple groups treated simultaneously. 
Essentially, we estimated a heterogeneous treatment effect from an event study across different treated groups using a Diff-In-Diff-
like setting. Note that because the treatment in our study was rather exogenous (as opposed to most other event studies, where the 
treatment was endogenous), the ATT in our study was actually equivalent to the Average Treatment Effect (ATE, E[y_i1 – y_i0]), 
because the chance of getting treatment was orthogonal to the outcome (treat_i ⊥ (yi1, yi0)) (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 
1984).  
39 Besides, we also conducted a survival analysis using the Cox-Proportional Hazard Model to examine the COVID-19 mean 
treatment effect on an individual’s Hazard rate of opt out. Overall, we found that the mean effect remained qualitatively consistent.  
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relationships, we first examined the relationship between American’s daily social-distancing practice and 
the daily number of people choosing to opt out of location tracking at a census block level in each of the 20 
cities. For each city, we conducted a panel data analysis using the Poisson model: 
𝐸(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡) =  exp (𝛼𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + +𝛽10𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡),      [3]                                                                                                                                   
where j represents each census block, and t represents each day; 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡  contains an 
individual’s daily social-distancing measures aggregated at the block level, such as the daily total number 
of close contacts, the daily total traveling distance, the daily average traveling speed, the daily total number 
of unique locations visited, and the daily average time spent at each different location; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡  is the 
treatment indicator for whether or not it was after President Trump’s declaration of the national emergency, 
and the interaction effect 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 captures the heterogeneous treatment effect of the 
COVID-19 national emergency declaration across different social-distancing groups. We also ran the same 
model without the interaction effect to examine the mean effect of COVID-19 on Americans’ privacy 
choice, as well as the relationship between people’s practice of social distancing and willingness to share 
their location data. Similarly to Equation [2], we also controlled for all other factors including 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 and 
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡  dummies, 𝑇𝑡  time trend,𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 , 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 , 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 , 
and 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗.  
To further understand the effect of political affiliation, we also ran a pooled analysis with ten blue 
cities and ten red cities. For robustness checking, we also conducted analyses using the Negative Binomial 
model with block-level and day-level fixed effects.  
We provide the corresponding results in Tables 3-4. Next, we will discuss our findings in detail 
from these two levels of analysis.   
6. Findings 
In this section, we first discuss our main findings. Then, we will also discuss some additional falsification 
tests conducted to validate our findings.   
6.1 Main Results 
We estimated both individual-day-level and block-day-level models specified in Equations [1]-[3], and we 
report our empirical results in Tables 2-4.  
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Table 2 presents the results of exploring for the effects of the COVID-19 national emergency 
declaration, income, gender, and race on privacy concerns in D.C. on the individual-day level. We 
conducted the same econometric analysis on all of the cities listed above. The results demonstrated strong 
robustness across the different cities (i.e., they were qualitatively similar). We choose D.C. as an example 
here. The estimation result tables for the other cities are provided in Appendix A, Tables A1-A20.  
Table 2. Effects of COVID-19, Income, Gender, and Race on Privacy Concern  
City = D.C. 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Treatment 
Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.027** 
(0.011) 
    
Treat × Income < 60K  -0.382**** 
(0.035) 
 -0.068*** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × Income 60-100K  -0.159**** 
(0.048) 
 -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × Income 100-150K  0.131**** 
(0.041) 
 0.058*** 
(0.005) 
 
Treat × Income 150-200K  0.223**** 
(0.059) 
 0.015** 
(0.006) 
 
Treat × Income > 200K  0.079** 
(0.032) 
 0.060*** 
(0.003) 
 
Treat × Race White   0.480**** 
(0.048) 
 0.035*** 
(0.006) 
Treat × Race Black   0.218**** 
(0.049) 
 0.011* 
(0.006) 
Treat × Race Asian   1.516**** 
(0.091) 
 0.030*** 
(0.009) 
Treat × Race Native   -0.059 
(0.321) 
 -0.018 
(0.037) 
Treat × Race Others   -0.443**** 
(0.046) 
 0.023*** 
(0.006) 
Time Trend 0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.048*** 
(0.000) 
0.048*** 
(0.000) 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -723950.51 -723655.16 -723477.58 ---- ---- 
Observations 1,542,977 1,542,977 1,542,977 1,542,977 1,542,977 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
 
Column (1) shows the mean effect of the COVID-19 national emergency declaration on people’s 
likelihood of opting out of location tracking. The negative and statistically significant coefficient with 
magnitude -0.027 suggests that the COVID-19 national emergency has a negative marginal effect and that 
on an average it will decrease the probability of a consumer opting out of location tracking by 1.6%. This 
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result is consistent with the model-free evidence, and indicates that Americans are more willing to share 
their location data after the Trump Administration declared the national emergency.   
Column (2) looks at how the treatment effect is heterogeneous across different income groups. The 
coefficients on the low-income bracket (below 60k) and 60k-100k are both negative and statistically 
significant, whereas the coefficients on the high-income brackets (100k-150k, 150k-200k, >200k) are 
positive and statistically significant. These results are striking. In general, they suggest that compared with 
low-income people, high-income people were not only more privacy-concerned before COVID-19, but also 
have become even more privacy-concerned and more likely to opt out of location tracking. In contrast, low-
income people have become even less privacy-conscious after COVID-19. Column (3) reports the treatment 
effect as interacted with race. The findings regarding how race moderates the main effect are heterogeneous 
across different cities. Columns (4) and (5) present the analysis results based on the Linear Probability 
Model (LPM).  
We also looked at how the treatment effect varies with gender. The result indicated that males, in 
general, are more privacy-concerned than females, and that moreover, after COVID-19, males have become 
even more privacy-concerned and more likely to opt out of location tracking. In contrast, females have 
become even less privacy-concerned. The above findings remain highly similar among the cities. The 
details across all 20 cities are reported in Appendix A, Tables A1-A20. 
As a response to COVID-19, people have been encouraged to stay home and practice social 
distancing to help stem the spread of the viral pandemic. It was reported by CNN that the Trump 
administration wanted to use personal mobile location data to track the level of social distancing and trace 
close contacts to prevent the spread of coronavirus. An intriguing question given this situation is whether 
people may want to sacrifice their privacy for the greater social good. So, we turned to an examination of 
how people’s opt-out decision is affected by the COVID-19 national emergency declaration and social 
distancing across the 20 cities. We present our results on Washington D.C. in Table 3 as an example. Results 
for all of the other cities are presented in Tables B1-B20 in Appendix B.  
The analysis was conducted on the block level. We report in Column (1) of Table 3 a specification 
which includes the national emergency treatment (i.e., Treat), and three variables that capture how well 
people practice social distancing (i.e., Total Daily Contacts, Daily Travel Distance, and Daily Average 
Travel Speed). We were also interested in the heterogeneous treatment effect on people practicing different 
levels of social distancing. So, we included an additional specification with an interaction effect between 
Treat and Total Daily Contacts.  
The coefficient on Treat, across the 20 cities, tells a consistent story: people were less likely to opt 
out and more willing to share their mobile locations after the COVID-19 national emergency declaration. 
The coefficients on Total Daily Contacts, Daily Travel Distance, and Daily Average Travel Speed are both 
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positive and significant. This indicates a positive relationship between the practice of social distancing and 
the willingness to share location data. People who travelled more and interacted with a larger number of 
close contacts during the pandemic were also more likely to opt out of location tracking. On the flip side, 
people who practiced social distancing (i.e., those who travelled less and interacted with fewer close 
contacts during the pandemic) were also more likely to share their location data. Taking the coefficient on 
Total Daily Contacts in Table 3 as an example, we can explain the result in an intuitive way: one unit 
increase in face-to-face contact in a block, is associated with a 1.303 (=exp(0.265)) increase in the number 
of opt outs in the same block on the same day.  
Table 3. Effects of COVID-19 and Social Distancing on Privacy Concern 
City = D.C. 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Mean Effect 
(Poisson) 
 
(2) 
Interaction w/ 
Daily Contacts 
(Poisson) 
 
(3) 
Mean Effect 
(Negative 
Binomial) 
 
(4) 
Interaction w/ 
Daily Contacts 
(Negative 
Binomial) 
Treat -0.262**** 
(0.028) 
-0.416**** 
(0.029) 
-0.239*** 
(0.037) 
-0.350*** 
(0.039) 
Treat × Total Daily Contacts 
 
0.219**** 
(0.012) 
 0.193*** 
(0.020) 
     Total Daily Contacts 0.265**** 
(0.006) 
0.206**** 
(0.007) 
0.272*** 
(0.010) 
0.218*** 
(0.011) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.358**** 
(0.010) 
0.363**** 
(0.010) 
0.410*** 
(0.014) 
0.403*** 
(0.014) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.081**** 
(0.001) 
0.081**** 
(0.001) 
0.102*** 
(0.002) 
0.101*** 
(0.002) 
Time Trend 0.016*** 
(0.000) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.021*** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables     
Population Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Race  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -44233.39 -43823.91 -40542.02 -40493.94 
Observations 84,270 84,270 84,270 84,270 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
Models (1) ~ (2) are based on the Poisson Model; Models (3) ~ (4) are based on the Negative Binomial Model. 
 
Table 4. Pooled Analyses: Red Cities vs. Blue Cities  
Effects of COVID-19 National Emergency Declaration and Social Distancing on Privacy Concern 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main 
Effect 
(10 Red 
Cities) 
(2) 
w/ Social 
Distancing 
(10 Red 
Cities) 
(3) 
Interaction w/ 
Daily Contacts 
(10 Red Cities) 
(4) 
Main 
Effect 
(10 Blue 
Cities) 
(5) 
w/ Social 
Distancing 
(10 Blue 
Cities) 
(6) 
Interaction w/ 
Daily 
Contacts (10 
Blue Cities) 
(7) 
Main Effect 
Using Pooled Regression 
w/ Blue Dummy (All 20 
Cities) 
Treat -0.127**** 
(0.010) 
-0.112**** 
(0.010) 
-0.511**** 
(0.012) 
-0.325**** 
(0.010) 
-0.264**** 
(0.011) 
-0.472**** 
(0.011) 
-0.306**** 
(0.007) 
Treat × Daily Contacts 
  
0.222**** 
(0.003) 
  
0.315**** 
(0.005) 
 
Daily Contacts 
 
0.431**** 
(0.002) 
0.326**** 
(0.002) 
 
0.311**** 
(0.003) 
0.221**** 
(0.003) 
 
Daily Travel Distance 
 
0.876**** 
(0.004) 
0.859**** 
(0.004) 
 
0.975**** 
(0.004) 
0.970**** 
(0.004) 
 
Blue City Dummy 
      
-0.399**** 
(0.004) 
Time Trend 0.008**** 
(0.000) 
0.025**** 
(0.000) 
0.024**** 
(0.000) 
0.015**** 
(0.000) 
0.023**** 
(0.000) 
0.024**** 
(0.000) 
0.018**** 
(0.000) 
Inflection Rate -4.858**** 
(0.188) 
-4.015**** 
(0.185) 
-2.097**** 
(0.185) 
-1.913**** 
(0.046) 
-0.975**** 
(0.046) 
-0.626**** 
(0.047) 
-2.059**** 
(0.041) 
Death Rate 
 
-13.53**** 
(0.427) 
-12.01**** 
(0.397) 
-9.645**** 
(0.382) 
-4.157**** 
(0.110) 
-4.946**** 
(0.111) 
-4.959**** 
(0.111) 
-3.381*** 
(0.092) 
Control Variables        
Population, Block Land Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income, Gender, Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week, Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -354744.31 -309058.27 -306768.31 -409090.70 -371947.60 -370188.06 -775273.14 
Observations 601,974 601,974 601,974 1,165,364 1,165,364 1,165,364 1,767,338 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
Models (1)~(7) are based on the Poisson Model. We also ran analyses using the Negative Binomial Model, and the results remained highly consistent. 
What is more striking was that the positive relationship between social distancing and location 
sharing became even more salient after the national emergency was declared. This is supported by the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient (i.e., 0.219) on the interaction terms Treat and Total Daily 
Contacts in Column (2) of Table 3. 
Because the outcome variable was the number of total opt outs in each block, we conducted count 
data analyses using both the Poisson and Negative Binomial models. Columns (1) – (2) are based on the 
Poisson Model and Columns (3) – (4) are based on the Negative Binomial Model. We found that the results 
remained highly consistent.40 While Table 3 shows the results for D.C., Appendix B provides the replicated-
analysis results for all 20 cities. The results were robust across cities as well. 
Table 5 – Effects of National Emergency Declaration vs. State-specific Lockdown Order on Privacy 
Concern 
City  State 
State Order 
Effective Date 
Mean Effect 
(State-specific) 
Mean Effect 
(National Emergency) 
SFO CA Mar 19, 2020 -0.708**** (0.029) -0.678**** (0.030) 
New York City NY Mar 22, 2020 -0.828**    (0.028) -0.344**** (0.027) 
New Orleans LA Mar 23, 2020 -0.489**** (0.032) -0.048* (0.028) 
Seattle WA Mar 23, 2020 0.106**** (0.031) -0.469**** (0.031) 
Boston MA Mar 24, 2020 -0.468**** (0.025) -0.562**** (0.026) 
Lexington KY Mar 26, 2020 -0.095**** (0.024) -0.580**** (0.026) 
Colorado Springs CO Mar 26, 2020 -0.015  (0.025) -0.678**** (0.026) 
Oklahoma City OK Mar 28, 2020 -0.059* (0.030) -0.188**** (0.027) 
Virginia Beach VA Mar 30, 2020 0.189**** (0.032) -0.543**** (0.029) 
Baltimore MD Mar 30, 2020 -0.271**** (0.026) -0.337**** (0.027) 
Wichita KS Mar 30, 2020 0.050 (0.031) -0.239**** (0.027) 
Nashville TN Mar 31, 2020 -0.147**** (0.030) -0.264**** (0.027) 
Phoenix AZ Mar 31, 2020 -0.060* (0.036) -0.441**** (0.030) 
D.C. DC Apr 1, 2020 -0.075*** (0.027) -0.279**** (0.014) 
Pittsburgh PA Apr 1, 2020 -0.001 (0.033) -0.457**** (0.029) 
Philadelphia PA Apr 1, 2020 -0.122**** (0.030) -0.476**** (0.029) 
Austin TX Apr 2, 2020 0.032 (0.033) -0.312**** (0.027) 
Arlington TX Apr 2, 2020 0.076*** (0.028) -0.215****  (0.026) 
Jacksonville FL Apr 3, 2020 0.044 (0.035) -0.254**** (0.030) 
Omaha NE n/a# -- -0.392**** (0.028) 
Same control variable used in 
Table 3 
Yes 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
# Nebraska never ordered residents to stay home. 
The results are based on the main analyses using the Poisson Model. We also ran the same analyses using the 
Negative Binomial Model, and the results remained highly consistent. 
 
40 As a robustness test, we also ran the same analysis by controlling for the social demographics, population density, app usage, 
and opt-in/out activities of the neighboring (i.e., geographically adjacent) blocks. We found that our results remained highly 
consistent. The detailed results are provided in Table C in Appendix C.  
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Furthermore, we conduct pooled analyses for all 20 cities to see if the effect of social distancing on 
privacy concerns varied across political affiliations. The results are shown in Table 4. First, we ran the 
pooled analysis for all 10 red cities and for all 10 blue cities separately, as shown in Columns (1) to (6). 
Then, we ran the pooled analysis with all 20 cities together using a “Blue City” indicator, as shown in 
Column (7). Looking at Columns (1) to (6), the coefficients are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. 
This indicates that individuals who practice social distancing are more likely to share their location data 
than are those who do not practice social distancing. Besides, comparing the coefficients of the interaction 
effect between treatment and daily contacts in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 4, we found that such a positive 
correlation between social distancing and location sharing appears more salient in blue cities than in red 
ones after COVID-19.  
 In addition, we conducted similar analyses at the block-day level for all 20 cities using the state-
specific lockdowns in each city as the treatment variable. We provide the mean effects of the two treatments 
(National Emergency vs. State Lockdown) in Table 5 for comparison. We found that the results remained 
qualitatively consistent in a large majority of the cities.41 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
In consideration of all the empirical evidence shown above, we summarize our major findings as follows.  
Political Affiliation and Privacy Concern. People were more willing to share their mobile locations after 
President Trump declared the COVID-19 national emergency on March 13. The results were also consistent 
in each city when we used the state-specific lockdowns in each city as the treatment variable. Despite the 
increasing concern that government authorities, the private sector, and public health experts may have to 
use individual-level location data to track the coronavirus, we find that there is a significant and decreasing 
trend of opt out of location sharing with mobile apps in the U.S. Our results are consistent with recent 
studies42 demonstrating an increased willingness of Americans to share location and health data to help 
slow the spread of the virus and reduce the lockdown period. While in general people in the blue cities were 
more privacy-concerned than those in the red cities before the advent of the COVID-19 crisis, there was a 
significant decrease in opt-out rates after COVID-19, and this effect was more salient in the blue cities than 
in the red cities. 
 
41 We noticed the effect of state lockdown was positive in Arlington and Virginia Beach. This was likely due to the fact that the 
lockdown orders in those two states (TX and VA) were issued relatively late (Apr. 2 and Mar 30); we did not have enough daily 
observations to fully observe the post-treatment trend (i.e., April 15 is the last day of observation in the current data set). The 
estimate of the effect of the state order also appears positive for Seattle, which seems somewhat noisy. We are now collecting post-
April 15 data to run additional robustness tests.  
42 https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/will-americans-be-willing-to-install-covid-19-tracking-apps/ 
http://webuse.org/covid/ 
https://www.emarketer.com/content/consumers-are-more-willing-to-share-private-data-during-covid-19 
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Social Distancing and Privacy Concern. The practice of social distancing and willingness to share 
location data were positively correlated: people who practice social distancing (i.e., those who travel less 
and interact with fewer close contacts during the pandemic) were also more likely to share their location 
data, whereas anti-social-distancing people (i.e., those who travel more and interact with a greater number 
of close contacts during the pandemic) were more likely to opt out of location tracking; such positive 
relationship between social distancing and location sharing has become even more salient after Trump 
declared the national emergency (and after the state-specific lockdowns); such positive relationship 
between social distancing and location sharing appeared to be more salient in blue cities than in red ones 
after the declaration. 
Social Demographics and Privacy Concern. High-income people and males, in general, are more privacy-
concerned than are low-income people and females. After COVID-19, high-income people has become 
even more privacy-concerned and more likely to opt out of location tracking.  
Finally, an interesting observation from both our individual-level analyses (Table 2, Tables A1-
A20) and block-level analyses (Table 3, Tables B1-B20) suggests two opposing forces with respect to 
privacy concern. On the one hand, our findings show a positive relationship between willingness to practice 
social distancing and willingness to share location data. This seems also to suggest an underlying pro-social 
cause that might positively affect both people’s compliance to national/state lockdown orders and their 
willingness to trade privacy for social good during the pandemic period. Such pro-social behavior is also 
moderated by the potential health risk. Previous research43 has shown that people whom the CDC has 
identified as being higher risk were more likely to be willing to install contact-tracing apps for location 
tracking. We found consistent evidence that health risk factors (infection rate and death rate) had a 
significant negative effect on people’s opt-out behavior, and that cities that were hit harder by COVID-19 
demonstrated a more salient drop in the opt-out rate44.  
On the other hand, the change in people’s opt-out behavior could also be a result of a change in 
time availability. With the increased time available due to shelter-at-home and social-distancing policies, it 
is conceivable that consumers may more likely have the time to read through the mobile apps’ privacy 
policies and react accordingly given the increased surveillance concerns and awareness. In our data, we 
observe a general increasing trend in people opting out of location tracking before COVID-19. If indeed 
people had more time at home after COVID-19 and were checking their privacy settings more thoroughly, 
 
43 http://webuse.org/covid/ 
44 We found that blue cities on average were hit harder by COVID-19 than red cities in terms of both infection rate and death rate 
(as shown in Table D in Appendix D). This is consistent with our observation of a pro-social cause and to some extent explains 
why blue cities witnessed a larger drop in opt-out rate after COVID.  
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we would expect to see more opt outs, given the general increasing trend in privacy concern. Hence, this 
indicates that time availability may negatively affect people’s willingness to share location data. We also 
saw such evidence from the weekend effect in the data – when people have more free time during weekends 
they are more likely to opt out of location tracking compared with during weekdays. This pattern becomes 
less prominent after COVID-19, potentially due to a blurred boundary between weekends and weekdays, 
particularly after the stay-at-home order. Therefore, whether a consumer is more likely to share location 
data or not after COVID-19 depends on which force plays the dominant role.  
Interestingly, our results show that on average people were more likely to share their location data 
after COVID-19. This indicates that the pro-social cause seems to play a more dominant role in the entire 
American population. This trend is especially prominent for the low-income groups. This could potentially 
be due to the fact that many low-income people are essential workers and did not experience a marked 
increase in time availability after COVID-19. In contrast, we observed that high-income people became 
more privacy-concerned and more likely to opt out of location tracking. This seems to indicate that the 
effect of time availability plays a more dominant role in this case— high-income people having received a 
stronger positive shock to their time availability after COVID-19. Given the more practical nature of high-
income groups, they would be more likely to use such increased time availability to check/revise privacy 
settings.45 
6.3 Falsification Tests 
To validate the robustness of our findings, we conducted a number of falsification tests.  
(1) Alternative Treatment Dates. 
First, we were interested in testing whether the treatment (the COVID-19 national emergency 
declaration on Mar. 13) indeed has brought a negative shock to people’s privacy opt-out behavior, or if 
there was simply a downward trend over time. The week, day-of-week dummies and day index in our model 
could help to a large extent to control for such time trends. Besides, as we can see in Figure 3, the 
predominant drop in the opt-out rate does not appear until after the treatment.  
To further validate our results, we reran our analyses using alternative hypothetical dates prior to 
March 13 as treatment dates. Because March 13 is a Friday, we chose two alternative Fridays in January 
(Jan. 17, Jan. 24) and two in February (Feb. 14, Feb. 28), and ran our estimations, separately, again. Overall, 
we did not find a similar statistically significant drop in people’s opt-out behavior under the hypothetical 
treatment dates. 
 
45 Our finding is also consistent with several recent studies (e.g., Chiou and Tucker 2020) showing that people from higher-income 
regions display more compliance with social distancing and “remain-at-home” orders (hence enjoying a higher increase in time 
availability). 
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We conducted this falsification test for all of the cities. We illustrate the results in Table 6 using 
D.C. as an example. We can see that the estimated treatment effects are mostly statistically insignificant, 
and moreover, the direction of the effects is mostly positive (as opposed to a negative effect after the actual 
treatment of Mar. 13). 
(2) Exogeneity of Treatment.  
Second, there might be a concern that the treatment is not completely exogenous. For example, the 
mainstream media articles on location tracking could have appeared because they had observed significant 
changes in people’s willingness to share their location data. We argue that this is very unlikely. First of all, 
those articles were written in response to the recent emergence of contact-tracing technologies developed 
by tech companies like Google and Apple, instead of in reaction to the observation of changes in consumers’ 
opt-out behavior. Furthermore, the development of contact-tracing technologies has been in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which is completely exogenous and has nothing to do with consumer privacy 
behavior. In addition, to further test this, we also ran a set of prediction models to see if people’s opt-out 
behavior can predict the treatment variable. We found the predictive performance to be rather low (e.g., 
Taking Washington D.C. as an example, the correlation between previous opt-out rate and future treatment 
was statistically insignificant. The prediction accuracy was merely 67%). 
Table 6. Falsification Test - Alternative Treatment Dates 
City = D.C. 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Treatment  
Jan. 17 
(2) 
Treatment 
Jan. 24 
(3) 
Treatment 
Feb. 14 
(4) 
Treatment 
Feb. 28 
Treat 0.069* 
(0.040) 
0.051 
(0.033) 
-0.006 
(0.026) 
0.038 
(0.024) 
Control Variables     
Population Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -48213.46 -48213.73 -48214.89 -48213.72 
Observations 84,270 84,270 84,270 84,270 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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(3) Opt outs vs. Uninstallation/New Installation 
 Finally, a potential alternative explanation to our main finding is that the observed decreasing trend 
of opt outs in the post-treatment period could have been due to an overall decrease in people’s mobile app 
usage. In particular, people could simply uninstall an app due to lack of interest in it, instead of just opting 
out of location tracking. The uninstallation behavior could also lead to the cessation of location data. 
However, it is important to note that in order to completely disappear from our location-data set, the 
individual needs to simultaneously uninstall all of the affiliated apps that use the location tracking SDK 
provided by our location-data partner. Given the market share of the company and the coverage of their 
client apps, this is very unlikely to occur.  
A related confounder is that the observed drop in opt outs after COVID-19 could also have been 
due to a sudden increase of new app installations— that is, because more people were stuck at home, they 
could have been installing new apps for convenience, some of which may require location tracking to 
function (e.g., Uber Eats for food delivery). This could potentially lead to more opt ins to location sharing, 
but it would have nothing to do with people’s existing privacy perspectives.  
 
     (a) Last Day of Observation              (b) 1 Day before Last Day               (c) 2 Days before Last Day 
  
                                   (d) 3 Days before Last Day           (e) 1 Week before Last Day  
Figure 8. Distribution of total #app activities for each “opt-out” user on (a) last day of observing 
that user; (b) 1 day before last day; (c) 2 days before last day; (d) 3 days before last day; and (e) 1 
week before last day 
To further test these alternative explanations, we conducted robustness tests to check individuals’ 
app usage behavior before the last day of observation (i.e., before the user opted out). Specifically, if our 
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result were due to uninstallations of all of the affiliated apps, we would expect to see a pre-existing 
decreasing trend for the opt-out users in their daily app activities before the opt out. In contrast, if our result 
were due to an increase in the new app installation, we would expect to see a pre-existing increasing trend 
in the users’ daily app activities. In our main analyses, we explicitly controlled for all of the app-usage-
related factors (e.g., total usage time, unique app categories, daily number of locations) over time at both 
the individual and block levels, and we found our findings to be highly robust. This step to a large extent 
controls for the pre-existing trends in app usage behavior. Moreover, based on a further comparison of the 
distribution of individual-level app activities, we did not find either a decreasing or an increasing trend 
before the opt out. For illustration, we show, in Figure 8, the distributions of the total individual-level 
numbers of app activities for Washing D.C.46 For each opt-out user, we plot the total app activities on the 
last day of observation, one/two/three days before the last day, and one week before the last day. As we can 
see in Figure 8, the distribution remains highly consistent across all days, suggesting no significant pre-
existing trend in user app activities.  
7. Limitations 
Our paper has some limitations. First, we cannot necessarily ascertain if the privacy opt-out behavior we 
observed is because of pro-social behavior or because people had more available time while they were at 
home that might make them want to change their privacy choices. That being said, we did observe that there 
was a general increasing trend of people opting out of location tracking over time before the COVID-19 
crisis, but that after the national emergency declaration and the state-specific lockdown dates, there was a 
reduction in the opt-out rates. If indeed people had more time at home after COVID-19 and were reading 
the privacy policies of mobile apps and checking their privacy settings more thoroughly, we would have 
expected to see more opt outs, given the general increasing trend in privacy concern. But we in fact saw 
fewer opt outs, and so this partially mitigates the concern about time, as opposed to pro-social behavior, 
being the driving factor. However, we do acknowledge that to unpack the mechanisms, we will likely need 
to conduct a survey that is outside the scope of this paper. We leave it to future research. 
8. Conclusions 
Having used a granular individual-level dataset consisting of over 22 billion records from ten 'Blue' 
(Democratic) and ten 'Red' (Republican) U.S. cities, we present some of the first evidence of how 
Americans responded to increasing privacy concerns during the COVID-19 pandemic. We demonstrate a 
significant decrease in the opt out of location sharing in the U.S. While areas with more Democrats were 
 
46 We have also provided a similar analysis of total app usage time in Figure E in Appendix E.   
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more privacy-concerned than areas with more Republicans before the advent of the COVID-19 crisis, there 
was a decrease in the overall opt-out rates after COVID-19, and this effect was more salient among the 
Democratic than Republican cities. People who practice social distancing were also less likely to opt out, 
whereas the converse was true for those less compliant with social distancing. This effect appeared to be 
more salient among the Democratic than Republican cities. Finally, we show that high-income populations, 
cities with a higher proportion of the white population, and males in general were more privacy-concerned 
relative to low-income populations, cities with a more diverse population, and females. Thus, demographic 
differences influenced the extent of pro-social behavior exhibited by Americans.  
Our results are consistent with recent surveys held in the post COVID-19 period that indicate that 
a majority of American are willing to allow mobile apps to disclose their locations in order to help public 
officials flag hot spots of COVID-19 and help slow the spread of the virus thereby. Our work can help 
dictate where more physical resources may be necessary for local governments to invest in order to curb 
the spread of Covid-19 in places that people are more likely to opt-out from location data sharing. Overall, 
our research demonstrates that Americans in both Blue and Red cities generally formed a unified front in 
sacrificing personal privacy for the societal good amid COVID-19, while simultaneously exhibiting a 
divergence in the extent of such a sacrifice along the lines of political affiliation, social-distancing 
compliance, and demographics. 
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Appendix A – Per City Results [1] 
Effect of COVID-19 and Demographics on Privacy Concern - Individual Level Analyses 
 
 
Table A1 - Boston 
City = Boston 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.004 
(0.011) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K  
-0.211**** 
(0.043) 
  
-0.052**** 
(0.003) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K  
-0.354**** 
(0.063) 
  
-0.109**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K  
-0.782**** 
(0.077) 
  
-0.092**** 
(0.007) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K  
0.581**** 
(0.087) 
  
0.268**** 
(0.007) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K  
0.216**** 
(0.041) 
  
0.082**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Female   
-0.010 
(0.029) 
  
0.034**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male   
0.013 
(0.056) 
  
0.038**** 
(0.005) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others    
0.091** 
(0.042) 
  
0.079**** 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race White    
-0.053 
(0.045) 
  
0.001 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race Black    
-0.718**** 
(0.054) 
  
-0.192**** 
(0.004) 
Treat × 
Race Asian    
0.020 
(0.056) 
  
-0.065**** 
(0.005) 
Treat × 
Race Native    
3.163**** 
(0.446) 
  
-0.251****   
(0.040) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-727156.46 -727021.97 -727156.44 -726842.64 0.461 0.460 0.462 
Observations 1,501,913 1,501,913 1,501,913 1,501,913 1,501,913 1,501,913 1,501,913 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A2 – D.C. 
City = D.C. 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.027** 
(0.011) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.382**** 
(0.035) 
  -0.068*** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.159**** 
(0.048) 
  -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 0.131**** 
(0.041) 
  0.058*** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.223**** 
(0.059 
  0.015** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.079** 
(0.032) 
  0.060*** 
(0.003) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.234**** 
(0.032) 
 
 
-0.057* 
(0.003) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.433**** 
(0.062) 
 
 
-0.013**** 
(0.007) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.443**** 
(0.046)   
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.480**** 
(0.048)   
0.011* 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.218**** 
(0.049)   
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.516**** 
(0.091)   
-0.018 
(0.037) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -0.059 
(0.321)   
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-723950.51 -723655.16 -723927.00 -723477.58 0.466 0.465 0.466 
Observations 1,542,977 1,542,977 1,542,977 1,542,977 1,542,977 1,542,977 1,542,977 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A3 – Baltimore 
City = Baltimore 
 
Tr. = National 
Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction w/ 
Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat 0.070**** 
(0.010) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.516**** 
(0.084) 
  -0.062*** 
(0.003) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.167* 
(0.094) 
  0.057**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.138 
(0.093) 
  0.124**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -0.020 
(0.121) 
  0.056**** 
(0.009) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.387**** 
(0.084) 
  0.050**** 
(0.003) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.203**** 
(0.026) 
 
 
0.029**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.558**** 
(0.049) 
 
 
0.056**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.516**** 
(0.063)   
0.039**** 
0.003) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.706**** 
(0.065)   
0.058**** 
0.003) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.237**** 
(0.065)   
-0.097**** 
0.003) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.056**** 
(0.082)   
0.074**** 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   1.746**** 
(0.369)   
-0.361**** 
(0.047) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-777006.12 -776778.3 -776941.71 -776417.23 0.418 0.417 0.419 
Observations  1,540,515  1,540,515  1,540,515  1,540,515 1,540,515 1,540,515 1,540,515 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4 – Lexington 
City = Lexington 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.176**** 
(0.009) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.023 
(0.073) 
  -0.142**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.488**** 
(0.079) 
  -0.181**** 
(0.008) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.593**** 
(0.106) 
  -0.208**** 
(0.010) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.308** 
(0.152) 
  -0.148**** 
(0.015) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.016 
(0.071) 
  0.172**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.333**** 
(0.037) 
 
 
-0.046**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.314**** 
(0.071) 
 
 
0.135**** 
(0.008) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.534**** 
(0.071)   
0.101**** 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.326**** 
(0.074)   
-0.085**** 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.534**** 
(0.088)   
-0.088**** 
(0.008) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.286**** 
(0.117)   
-0.057**** 
(0.013) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   2.371**** 
(0.489)   
-0.054**** 
(0.055) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-738608.30 -738452.41 -738598.53 -738526.83 0.437 0.437 0.438 
Observations 1,462,140 1,462,140 1,462,140 1,462,140 1,462,140 1,462,140 1,462,140 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A5 – Colorado Spring 
City = Colorado Spring 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.078**** 
(0.009) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.158 
(0.114) 
  -0.008 
(0.010) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.336*** 
(0.117) 
  -0.053**** 
(0.010) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -1.122**** 
(0.144) 
  -0.212**** 
(0.013) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.293 
(0.205) 
  0.121**** 
(0.019) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.211* 
(0.113) 
  0.055**** 
(0.009) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.399**** 
(0.044) 
 
 
-0.047**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.634**** 
(0.084) 
 
 
0.129**** 
(0.008) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.396**** 
(0.058)   
-0.103**** 
(0.005) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.420**** 
(0.061)   
0.150**** 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.284*** 
(0.106)   
0.105**** 
(0.010) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   -2.086**** 
(0.189)   
-0.289**** 
(0.018) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   2.491**** 
(0.462)   
0.344**** 
(0.042) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-621877.48 -621726.60 -621849.09 -621744.97 0.522 0.522 0.523 
Observations 1,279,077 1,279,077 1,279,077 1,279,077 1,279,077 1,279,077 1,279,077 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A6 – Virginia Beach 
City = Virginia Beach 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.085**** 
(0.009) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 0.474**** 
(0.063) 
  0.047**** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 0.796**** 
(0.085) 
  -0.004 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 0.247*** 
(0.078) 
  0.037**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.661**** 
(0.129) 
  -0.286**** 
(0.010) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 -0.575**** 
(0.066) 
  0.011*** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.212**** 
(0.023) 
 
 
-0.023**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.246**** 
(0.041) 
 
 
0.079**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.296**** 
(0.084)   
0.047**** 
(0.004) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.521**** 
(0.087)   
-0.059**** 
(0.004) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   -0.032 
(0.097)   
0.070**** 
(0.005) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   -0.265** 
(0.117)   
-0.017** 
(0.008) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -5.026**** 
(0.691)   
-1.067**** 
(0.070) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-656051.69 -655970.38 -656033.72 -655828.52 0.475 0.474 0.475 
Observations 1,239,244 1,239,244 1,239,244 1,239,244 1,239,244 1,239,244 1,239,244 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A7 – SFO 
City = SFO 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.104**** 
(0.010) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 0.220**** 
(0.044) 
  0.002 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 0.195**** 
(0.055) 
  0.062**** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 0.244*** 
(0.073) 
  -0.016**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.411**** 
(0.106) 
  0.029**** 
(0.007) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 -0.311**** 
(0.042) 
  -0.040**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.108***    
(0.035) 
 
 
-0.011**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.009 
(0.067) 
 
 
-0.035**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.226**** 
(0.040)   
0.009**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.416**** 
(0.046)   
-0.060**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   -0.086 
(0.068)   
0.044**** 
(0.004) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   -0.448**** 
(0.046)   
-0.058**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -1.374**** 
(0.368)   
0.093** 
(0.038) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-715792.68 -715779.29 -715792.67 -715668.89 0.496 0.496 0.496 
Observations 1,653,110 1,653,110 1,653,110 1,653,110 1,653,110 1,653,110 1,653,110 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A8 – Jacksonville 
City = Jacksonville 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.089**** 
(0.009) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.302**** 
(0.083) 
  0.037**** 
(0.007) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.021 
(0.091) 
  0.122**** 
(0.008) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.676**** 
(0.113) 
  -0.126**** 
(0.011) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -1.009**** 
(0.177) 
  0.015 
(0.017) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.223*** 
(0.081) 
  -0.018** 
(0.007) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  0.198**** 
(0.047) 
 
 
0.061**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  -0.592**** 
(0.094) 
 
 
-0.095**** 
(0.009) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.257** 
(0.111)   
-0.052**** 
(0.010) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.152 
(0.116)   
0.065**** 
(0.010) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.043 
(0.119)   
0.059**** 
(0.010) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.294**** 
(0.167)   
0.251**** 
(0.016) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -4.966**** 
(0.826)   
-0.745**** 
(0.085) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-595232.56 -595155.02 -595213.21 -595134.94 0.511 0.511 0.511 
Observations 1,210,655 1,210,655 1,210,655 1,210,655 1,210,655 1,210,655 1,210,655 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A9 – New Orleans 
City = New Orleans 
 
Tr. = National 
Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction w/ 
Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat 0.175**** 
(0.012) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.662**** 
(0.093) 
  -0.284**** 
(0.033) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.019 
(0.111) 
  0.287**** 
(0.059) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -1.317**** 
(0.139) 
  -0.884**** 
(0.101) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.322 
(0.207) 
  0.835**** 
(0.135) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.697**** 
(0.094) 
  0.334**** 
(0.033) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  0.155**** 
(0.031) 
 
 
-0.151**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.040 
(0.057) 
 
 
0.130**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.892**** 
(0.081)   
0.066**** 
(0.005) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   1.201**** 
(0.084)   
-0.023**** 
(0.005) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   1.000**** 
(0.084)   
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.501**** 
(0.171)   
-0.178**** 
(0.011) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -1.102*** 
(0.349)   
0.550**** 
(0.042) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-593304.67 -593102.40 -593304.42 -593132.71 0.516 0.516 0.516 
Observations 1,486,512 1,486,512 1,486,512 1,486,512 1,486,512 1,486,512 1,486,512 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A10 – Omaha 
City = Omaha 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.112**** 
(0.008) 
   
   
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.841**** 
(0.082) 
  -0.116**** 
(0.008) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.751**** 
(0.088) 
  -0.083**** 
(0.009) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.667**** 
(0.103) 
  -0.230**** 
(0.011) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -1.474**** 
(0.156) 
  -0.331**** 
(0.017) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.681**** 
(0.082) 
  0.145**** 
(0.008) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.169**** 
(0.038) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.114 
(0.076) 
 
 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.731**** 
(0.067)   
-0.122**** 
(0.008) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.676**** 
(0.070)   
0.144**** 
(0.008) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.318**** 
(0.080)   
0.074**** 
(0.009) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.012**** 
(0.095)   
0.341**** 
(0.012) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -1.322**** 
(0.375)   
0.063 
(0.045) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood /  
R-squared 
-717022.55 -716956.06 -717021.42 -716885.82 0.436 0.436 0.437 
Observations 1,331,130 1,331,130 1,331,130 1,331,130 1,331,130 1,331,130 1,331,130 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A11 – NYC 
City = NYC 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat 0.133**** 
(0.012) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.579**** 
(0.026) 
  -0.144**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.804**** 
(0.046) 
  -0.122**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.496**** 
(0.058) 
  -0.087**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.494**** 
(0.076) 
  0.093**** 
(0.008) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.573**** 
(0.024) 
  0.158**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  0.023 
(0.022) 
  0.043**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.232**** 
(0.039) 
  0.048**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.007 
(0.025) 
  0.068**** 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.183**** 
(0.026) 
  0.008**** 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.030 
(0.029) 
  -0.072**** 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   0.122**** 
(0.033) 
  0.036**** 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   0.999** 
(0.402) 
  0.178**** 
(0.043) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -657206.31 -656664.26 -657189.48 -657156.01 0.476 0.475 0.476 
Observations 1,310,678 1,310,678 1,310,678 1,310,678 1,310,678 1,310,678 1,310,678 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A12 – Pittsburgh 
City = Pittsburgh 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat 0.136**** 
(0.008) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.081* 
(0.045) 
  -0.003 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.256**** 
(0.061) 
  -0.049**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.237**** 
(0.065) 
  -0.016** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.884**** 
(0.115) 
  0.005 
(0.011) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.145**** 
(0.044) 
  0.057**** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  0.230**** 
(0.031) 
  0.024**** 
(0.003) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  -0.352**** 
(0.062) 
  0.036**** 
(0.006) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.041 
(0.076) 
  0.065**** 
(0.008) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.087 
(0.077) 
  -0.026**** 
(0.008) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   -0.229*** 
(0.087) 
  -0.075**** 
(0.009) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.380**** 
(0.126) 
  0.205**** 
(0.012) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   1.450 
(1.133) 
  -0.534**** 
(0.097) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -599325.79 -596372.07 -596424.72 -596308.86 0.482 0.482 0.483 
Observations 2,063,683 2,063,683 2,063,683 2,063,683 2,063,683 2,063,683 2,063,683 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A13 – Oklahoma City 
City = Oklahoma City 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.029*** 
(0.009) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.113*** 
(0.043) 
  -0.008* 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.382**** 
(0.055) 
  -0.058**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.607**** 
(0.077) 
  -0.203**** 
(0.008) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -0.403**** 
(0.119) 
  -0.018 
(0.013) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.214**** 
(0.042) 
  0.075**** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.160**** 
(0.026) 
  -0.015**** 
(0.003) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.261****   
(0.049) 
  0.092**** 
(0.005) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.172**** 
(0.037) 
  0.073**** 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.190**** 
(0.041) 
  -0.046**** 
(0.004) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   -0.345**** 
(0.049) 
  -0.046**** 
(0.005) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   -0.123 
(0.097) 
  -0.079**** 
(0.010) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -0.682**** 
(0.126) 
  -0.045*** 
(0.015) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -643904.68 -643785.43 -643890.65 -643872.94 0.476 0.462 0.462 
Observations 1,206,577 1,206,577 1,206,577 1,206,577 1,206,577 1,206,577 1,206,577 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A14 – Philadelphia 
City = Philadelphia 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.028**** 
(0.010) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.663**** 
(0.020) 
  -0.149**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.429**** 
  (0.045) 
  -0.103**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.517**** 
  (0.051) 
  -0.065**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -0.197**** 
(0.080) 
  -0.029**** 
(0.009) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.446**** 
(0.018) 
  0.136**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  0.269**** 
(0.017) 
  0.102**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  -0.667**** 
(0.031) 
  -0.149**** 
(0.003) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.320**** 
(0.018) 
  0.113**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.363**** 
(0.018) 
  -0.077**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   -0.565**** 
(0.022) 
  -0.139**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   -0.141*** 
(0.052) 
  -0.023**** 
(0.005) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -4.645**** 
(0.512) 
  -0.903**** 
(0.055) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -682891.69 -682257.77 -682666.95 -682539.46 0.453 0.452 0.452 
Observations 1,319,188 1,319,188 1,319,188 1,319,188 1,319,188 1,319,188 1,319,188 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A15 – Austin 
City = Austin 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.026 
(0.010) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.116**** 
(0.023) 
  -0.011**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 0.116**** 
(0.041) 
  0.041**** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.659**** 
(0.057) 
  -0.177**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -0.410**** 
(0.089) 
  -0.088**** 
(0.009) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.117**** 
(0.020) 
  0.059**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.060*** 
(0.021) 
  0.020**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  0.067* 
(0.037) 
  0.026**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.090**** 
(0.025) 
  0.064**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.139**** 
(0.026) 
  -0.038**** 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.136** 
(0.056) 
  0.069**** 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   -0.469**** 
(0.069) 
  -0.143**** 
(0.007) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   0.091 
(0.404) 
  -0.079** 
(0.046) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -651003.54 -650891.85 -651001.96 -650956.85 0.480 0.479 0.480 
Observations 1,260,615 1,260,615 1,260,615 1,260,615 1,260,615 1,260,615 1,260,615 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A16 – Seattle 
City = Seattle 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.286**** 
(0.012) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 0.298**** 
(0.058) 
  0.070**** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 0.319**** 
(0.070) 
  0.024**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 0.127 
(0.082) 
  0.006**** 
(0.006) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 0.201 
(0.128) 
  -0.072**** 
(0.010) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 -0.538****    
(0.057) 
  -0.042**** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.239**** 
(0.041) 
  -0.015**** 
(0.003) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  -0.093 
(0.080) 
  0.017**** 
(0.006) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.237**** 
(0.050) 
  0.001 
(0.004) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.076 
(0.054) 
  -0.010** 
(0.004) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.497**** 
(0.079) 
  0.088**** 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   -0.253**** 
(0.070) 
  -0.065**** 
(0.005) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -0.120 
(0.215) 
  0.074**** 
(0.016) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -518579.67 -518549.17 -518579.00 -518503.34 0.559 0.559 0.559 
Observations 989,083 989,083 989,083 989,083 989,083 989,083 989,083 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A17 – Arlington 
City = Arlington 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat 0.066**** 
(0.009) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.385**** 
(0.117) 
  0.005 
(0.015) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.382**** 
(0.105) 
  0.090**** 
(0.014) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.572**** 
(0.162) 
  -0.064*** 
(0.021) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -0.285* 
(0.161) 
  -0.201**** 
(0.022) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.460**** 
(0.117) 
  0.053**** 
(0.015) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  -0.439**** 
(0.051) 
  -0.075**** 
(0.006) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  1.029**** 
(0.102) 
  0.265**** 
(0.013) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.133* 
(0.073) 
  0.130**** 
(0.010) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.051   
(0.079) 
  -0.086**** 
(0.011) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   -0.232*** 
(0.079) 
  -0.089**** 
(0.011) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   0.225** 
(0.104) 
  -0.044**** 
(0.014) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   1.675**** 
(0.373) 
  0.433**** 
(0.052) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -757979.10 -757968.40 -757928.76 -757933.83 0.382 0.382 0.382 
Observations 1,402,332 1,402,332 1,402,332 1,402,332 1,402,332 1,402,332 1,402,332 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A18 – Phoenix 
City = Phoenix 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.149**** 
(0.011) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.262**** 
(0.030) 
  -0.005** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.878**** 
(0.052) 
  -0.108**** 
(0.004) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -0.100 
(0.071) 
  -0.055**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -1.312**** 
(0.116) 
  -0.201**** 
(0.008) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.251**** 
(0.029) 
  0.056**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  0.047* 
(0.026) 
  0.027**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  -0.404**** 
(0.048) 
  -0.031**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.199**** 
(0.029) 
  0.053**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.393**** 
(0.031) 
  -0.051**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   -0.958**** 
(0.085) 
  -0.076**** 
(0.006) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   -0.690**** 
(0.098) 
  -0.122**** 
(0.007) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   0.160**** 
(0.040) 
  0.112**** 
(0.004) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -492242.38 -492019.28 -492207.64 -491948.07 0.603 0.602 0.603 
Observations 1,028,752 1,028,752 1,028,752 1,028,752 1,028,752 1,028,752 1,028,752 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A19 – Nashville 
City = Nashville 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.087**** 
(0.009) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 -0.315**** 
(0.023) 
  -0.011**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -0.581**** 
(0.042) 
  -0.029**** 
(0.005) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 0.123* 
(0.067) 
  0.036**** 
(0.007) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -1.989**** 
(0.119) 
  -0.363**** 
(0.013) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 0.273**** 
(0.021) 
  0.049**** 
(0.002) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  0.126**** 
(0.020) 
  0.051**** 
(0.002) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  -0.443**** 
(0.037) 
  -0.054**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   0.219**** 
(0.025) 
  0.043**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   -0.418**** 
(0.025) 
  -0.034**** 
(0.002) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   -0.253**** 
(0.030) 
  0.005 
(0.003) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.328**** 
(0.116) 
  0.235**** 
(0.013) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   -3.494**** 
(0.572) 
  -0.906**** 
(0.060) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -682305.99 -682052.04 -682234.92 -682066.34 0.448 0.448 0.448 
Observations 1,361,080 1,361,080 1,361,080 1,361,080 1,361,080 1,361,080 1,361,080 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table A20 – Wichita 
City = Wichita 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(Logit) 
(3) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(Logit) 
(4) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Interaction 
w/ Income 
(LPM) 
(6) 
Interaction 
w/ Gender 
(LPM) 
(7) 
Interaction 
w/ Race 
(LPM) 
Treat -0.023**** 
(0.008) 
      
Treat ×  
Income less than 60K 
 1.667**** 
(0.089) 
  -0.377**** 
(0.011) 
  
Treat × 
Income 60K – 100K 
 -1.689**** 
(0.090) 
  -0.509**** 
(0.011) 
  
Treat × 
Income 100K – 150K 
 -1.931**** 
(0.097) 
  -0.365**** 
(0.013) 
  
Treat × 
Income 150K – 200K 
 -1.352**** 
(0.111) 
  -0.750**** 
(0.026) 
  
Treat × 
Income more than 200K 
 -3.360**** 
(0.232) 
  0.431**** 
(0.011) 
  
Treat × 
Female 
  0.289**** 
(0.037) 
  0.019**** 
(0.004) 
 
Treat × 
Male 
  -0.617**** 
(0.072) 
  0.022**** 
(0.008) 
 
Treat × 
Race Others 
   -0.724**** 
(0.084) 
  -0.104**** 
(0.010) 
Treat × 
Race White 
   0.719**** 
(0.087) 
  0.135**** 
(0.010) 
Treat × 
Race Black 
   0.772**** 
(0.100) 
  0.188**** 
(0.011) 
Treat × 
Race Asian 
   1.056**** 
(0.117) 
  0.198**** 
(0.013) 
Treat × 
Race Native 
   0.586** 
(0.231) 
  0.093*** 
(0.027) 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  
Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood / R-squared -645866.14 -645645.75 -645829.84 -646011.79 0.456 0.455 0.455 
Observations 1,215,067 1,215,067 1,215,067 1,215,067 1,215,067 1,215,067 1,215,067 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Appendix B – Per City Results [2] 
Effect of COVID-19 Emergency and Social Distancing on Privacy Concern - Block Level Analyses 
 
Table B1 – Boston 
City = Boston 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.562**** 
(0.026) 
-0.615**** 
(0.028) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.063**** 
(0.012) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.310**** 
(0.007) 
0.289**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.228**** 
(0.010) 
0.223**** 
(0.010) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.064**** 
(0.001) 
0.064**** 
(0.001) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -51128.49 -51114.74 
Observations 97,308 97,308 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
  
55 
Table B2 – D.C. 
City = D.C. 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.262**** 
(0.028) 
-0.416**** 
(0.029) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.219**** 
(0.012) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.265**** 
(0.006) 
0.206**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.358**** 
(0.010) 
0.363**** 
(0.010) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.081**** 
(0.001) 
0.081**** 
(0.001) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -43984.82 -43823.91 
Observations 84,270 84,270 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
  
56 
Table B3 – Baltimore 
City = Baltimore 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.337**** 
(0.027) 
-0.520**** 
(0.029) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.248**** 
(0.015) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.257**** 
(0.008) 
0.169**** 
(0.010) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.361**** 
(0.012) 
0.345**** 
(0.012) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.087**** 
(0.001) 
0.087**** 
(0.001) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -33905.73 -33764.49 
Observations 71,126 71,126 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
  
57 
Table B4 – Lexington 
City = Lexington 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.580**** 
(0.026) 
-0.936**** 
0.031) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.203**** 
(0.009) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.259**** 
(0.006) 
0.153**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.171**** 
(0.012) 
0.166**** 
(0.012) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.001**** 
(0.000) 
0.001**** 
(0.000) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -33921.48 -33692.75 
Observations 26,500 26,500 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B5 – Colorado Spring 
City = Colorado Spring 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.678**** 
(0.026) 
0.046 
(0.038) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
-0.216**** 
(0.008) 
Total Daily Contacts 
0.192**** 
(0.005) 
0.319**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Travel Distance -0.559**** 
(0.015) 
-0.512**** 
(0.015) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.135**** 
(0.002) 
0.136**** 
(0.002) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood 39011.67 -38626.56 
Observations 33,496 33,496 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B6 – Virginia Beach 
City = Virginia Beach 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.543**** 
(0.029) 
-0.966**** 
(0.039) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.136**** 
(0.008) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.386**** 
(0.005) 
0.311**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.038** 
(0.018) 
0.043** 
(0.018) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.105**** 
(0.003) 
0.104**** 
(0.003) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -27880.47 -27750.04 
Observations 30,422 30,422 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B7 – SFO 
City = SFO 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.678**** 
(0.030) 
-0.673**** 
(0.030) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
-0.138* 
(0.083) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.313**** 
(0.020) 
0.322**** 
(0.021) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.523**** 
(0.008) 
0.525**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.039**** 
(0.001) 
0.039**** 
(0.001) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -53214.61 -53213.16 
Observations 132,924 132,924 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B8 – Jacksonville 
City = Jacksonville 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.254**** 
(0.030) 
-0.612**** 
(0.035) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.225**** 
(0.011) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.319**** 
(0.007) 
0.226**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.254**** 
(0.011) 
0.257**** 
(0.011) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.089**** 
(0.001) 
0.088**** 
(0.001) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -34270.20 -34073.08 
Observations 60,526 60,526 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B9 – New Orleans 
City = New Orleans 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.048* 
(0.028) 
-0.411**** 
(0.034) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.187**** 
(0.010) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.533**** 
(0.007) 
0.480**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.319**** 
(0.011) 
0.313**** 
(0.011) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.030**** 
(0.000) 
0.030**** 
(0.000) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -31425.97 -31258.84 
Observations 45,156 45,156 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B10 – Omaha 
City = Omaha 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
Treat -0.392**** 
(0.028) 
-0.628**** 
(0.035) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.101**** 
(0.009) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.335**** 
(0.005) 
0.283**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.144**** 
(0.013) 
0.145**** 
(0.013) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.109**** 
(0.002) 
0.109**** 
(0.002) 
Population 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Block Land Area 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Income 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Gender 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Population Race  
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage 
Controlled Yes Yes 
Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -33362.12 -33294.91 
Observations 48,972 48,972 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B11 – NYC 
City = NYC 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.344**** 
(0.027) 
-0.493**** 
(0.028) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.305**** 
(0.015) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.373**** 
(0.008) 
0.312**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.541**** 
(0.008) 
0.521**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.053**** 
(0.001) 
0.053**** 
(0.001) 
Time Trend 
0.023**** 
(0.001) 
0.024**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -62927.55 -62749.22 
Observations 291,394 291,394 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B12 – Pittsburgh 
City = Pittsburgh 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.457**** 
(0.029) 
-0.576**** 
(0.031) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.151**** 
(0.014) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.300**** 
(0.007) 
0.241**** 
(0.009) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.329**** 
(0.009) 
0.325**** 
(0.009) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed 0.063**** 
(0.001) 
0.062**** 
(0.001) 
Time Trend 
0.041**** 
(0.001) 
0.041**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -50332.35 -50277.06 
Observations 157,516 157,516 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B13 – Oklahoma City 
City = Oklahoma City 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.188**** 
(0.027) 
-0.365**** 
(0.030) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.153**** 
(0.011) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.262**** 
(0.006) 
0.193**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.250**** 
(0.010) 
0.246**** 
(0.010) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.087**** 
(0.001) 
0.087**** 
(0.001) 
Time Trend 
0.027**** 
(0.001) 
0.027**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -41041.46 -40953.54 
Observations 82,256 82,256 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B14 – Philadelphia 
City = Philadelphia 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.476**** 
(0.029) 
-0.500**** 
(0.029) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.141**** 
(0.021) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.240**** 
(0.010) 
0.206**** 
(0.011) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.466**** 
(0.007) 
0.462**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.043**** 
(0.001) 
0.043**** 
(0.001) 
Time Trend 
0.029**** 
(0.001) 
0.029**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -56737.51 -56716.98 
Observations 222,918 222,918 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B15 – Austin 
City = Austin 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.312**** 
(0.027) 
-0.542**** 
(0. 031) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.172**** 
(0.011) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.267**** 
(0.006) 
0.202**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.384**** 
(0.010) 
0.376**** 
(0.010) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  4.25e-07  
(5.42e-07) 
5.15e-07 
(5.42e-07) 
Time Trend 
0.024**** 
(0.001) 
0.024**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -41862.29 -41756.93 
Observations 65,190 65,190 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B16 – Seattle 
City = Seattle 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.469**** 
(0.031) 
-0.494**** 
(0.033) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.034**** 
(0.014) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.268**** 
(0.008) 
0.254**** 
(0.009) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.289**** 
(0.007) 
0.289**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.047**** 
(0.001) 
0.047**** 
(0.001) 
Time Trend 
0.040**** 
(0.001) 
0.040**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -60460.45 -60457.51 
Observations 297,542 297,542 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B17 – Arlington 
City = Arlington 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.215**** 
(0.026) 
-0.799**** 
(0.033) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.250**** 
(0.010) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.386**** 
(0.006) 
0.258**** 
(0.008) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.056**** 
(0.016) 
0.054*** 
(0.016) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.071**** 
(0.002) 
0.071**** 
(0.002) 
Time Trend 
0.033**** 
(0.001) 
0.034**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -26131.21 -25918.39 
Observations 27,772 27,772 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B18 – Phoenix 
City = Phoenix 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.441**** 
(0.030) 
-0.493**** 
(0.033) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.077**** 
(0.015) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.245**** 
(0.008) 
0.218**** 
(0.010) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.384**** 
(0.007) 
0.383**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  5.85e-07*** 
(1.90e-07) 
5.91e-07**** 
(1.90e-07) 
Time Trend 
0.036**** 
(0.001) 
0.037**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -60476.09 -60464.22 
Observations 264,364 264,364 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B19 – Nashville 
City = Nashville 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.264**** 
(0.027) 
-0.406**** 
(0.029) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.203**** 
(0.014) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.279**** 
(0.007) 
0.222**** 
(0.009) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.363**** 
(0.009) 
0.354**** 
(0.010) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.048**** 
(0.001) 
0.048**** 
(0.001) 
Time Trend 
0.025**** 
(0.001) 
0.025**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -36856.10 -36760.59 
Observations 58,512 58,512 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Table B20 – Wichita 
City = Wichita 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.239**** 
(0.027) 
-0.474**** 
(0.039) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.076**** 
(0.009) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.252**** 
(0.006) 
0.214**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Travel Distance -0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.129**** 
(0.002) 
0.127**** 
(0.002) 
Time Trend 
0.031**** 
(0.001) 
0.031**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Population Yes Yes 
Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Population Income Yes Yes 
Population Gender Yes Yes 
Population Race  Yes Yes 
Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -29658.793 -29626.42 
Observations 33,072 33,072 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Appendix C 
Table C – Robustness Test with Controls for Spatially Adjacent Blocks  
City = DC 
 
Tr. = National Emergency 
(1) 
Main Effect 
(Possion) 
(2) 
Interaction w/ Daily Contacts 
(Possion) 
Treat -0.199**** 
(0.028) 
-0.322**** 
(0.030) 
Treat × 
Total Daily Contacts  
0.145**** 
(0.012) 
Total Daily Contacts 0.214**** 
(0.007) 
0.173**** 
(0.007) 
Daily Travel Distance 0.298**** 
(0.011) 
0.289**** 
(0.011) 
Daily Avg. Travel Speed  0.071**** 
(0.001) 
0.072**** 
(0.001) 
Time Trend 
0.015**** 
(0.001) 
0.015**** 
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
Focal Block Population Yes Yes 
Focal Block Land Area Yes Yes 
Focal Block Population Income Yes Yes 
Focal Block Population Gender Yes Yes 
Focal Block Population Race  Yes Yes 
Focal Block Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
Focal Block Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
Focal Block Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
1st Closest Block Population Yes Yes 
1st Closest Block Land Area Yes Yes 
1st Closest Block Population Income Yes Yes 
1st Closest Block Population Gender Yes Yes 
1st Closest Block Population Race  Yes Yes 
1st Closest Block Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
1st Closest Block Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
1st Closest Block Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
2nd Closest Block Population Yes Yes 
2nd Closest Block Land Area Yes Yes 
2nd Closest Block Population Income Yes Yes 
2nd Closest Block Population Gender Yes Yes 
2nd Closest Block Population Race  Yes Yes 
2nd Closest Block Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
2nd Closest Block Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
2nd Closest Block Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
3rd Closest Block Population Yes Yes 
3rd Closest Block Land Area Yes Yes 
3rd Closest Block Population Income Yes Yes 
3rd Closest Block Population Gender Yes Yes 
3rd Closest Block Population Race  Yes Yes 
3rd Closest Block Number of Existing Users Yes Yes 
3rd Closest Block Number of Opt-in Users Yes Yes 
3rd Closest Block Mobile App Usage Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Day of Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -41420.74 -41352.1 
Observations 84,270 84,270 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Appendix D 
Table D – COVID-19 Health Risks in Blue Cities versus Red Cities 
 DV = Infection Rate DV = Death Rate 
Blue City 0.046**** 
(0.000) 
0.011**** 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.031 0.022 
Observations 1,767,338 1,767,338 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
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Appendix E – Additional Falsification Test 
 
 
 
(a) Last Day of Observation                   (b) 1 Day Before Last Day of Observation 
 
(c) 2 Days Before Last Day of Observation     (d) 3 Days Before Last Day of Observation 
 
(e) 7 Days Before Last Day of Observation      (f) 14 Days Before Last Day of Observation 
 
Figure E. Distribution of total #app usage time (minutes) for each “opt-out” user on (a) the last day 
of observing that user; (b) 1 day before last day; (c) 2 days before last day; (d) 3 days before last 
day; and (e) 1 week before last day. 
 
 
 
